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Abstract
This paper builds a general oligopolistic equilibrium model to investigate how within-
sector firm heterogeneities affect wage rate, country-wide profits, and welfare. Using linear
inverse demands, I consider asymmetric sectors, each involving n Cournot oligopolists
producing horizontally differentiated varieties with constant, though asymmetric, costs. I
link a measure of the average within-sector firm heterogeneity with the economy-wide,
endogenously determined, and competitive wage rate. For interior equilibriums, the
higher the “average” the lower the wage rate. Once general equilibrium feedbacks from
wage rate are considered, the “average” has an unclear impact on country-wide profits
and welfare, depending on moments of the technology distribution as well as demand pa-
rameters. The findings have implications to better understand antitrust and related policies.
Keywords: Cournot Competition; General Oligopolistic Equilibrium (GOLE); Asymmet-
ric Oligopoly; Horizontal Differentiation; Market Concentration; Antitrust
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1 Introduction
Firm heterogeneity in productivity has been playing an increasingly prominent role both the-
oretically and empirically in economics.1 New and richer micro-level (trade) data on firms
∗This paper is based on the first essay of my Ph.D. dissertation at the Marche Polytechnic University. I am
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1For review of theoretical and empirical literature, see Syverson (2011) on productivity differences in general.
For an example of subfield literature, see Bernard et al. (2007), Redding (2011), and Tybout (2003) on firm
heterogeneity and international trade.
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and plants, regarding several developed and developing countries and years, have progressively
become available since the late 1980s, allowing to explore new features.
Mayer and Ottaviano (2008) have summarized the empirical evidence on internationalized
firms in a subset of European countries by stating that
“[They] are superstars. They are rare and their distribution is highly skewed,
as a handful of firms accounts for most aggregate international activity.
[They] belong to an exclusive club. They are different from other firms. They
are bigger, generate higher value added, pay higher wages, employ more capital
per worker and more skilled workers and have higher productivity” (p. 14, em-
phasis added).
These stylized facts also hold for narrowly defined sectors. Firms within their interna-
tionalized sectors differ in efficiencies and thus in their own market shares. This evidence also
highlights the well-known asymmetric (or heterogeneous) efficiencies among firms within their
domestic markets. I believe that these stylized features of data call for general equilibrium mod-
els to account for both heterogeneous efficiencies and strategic interaction among rival firms.
On the one hand, heterogeneous firm efficiencies have been widely considered by scholars. On
the other hand, there exists a lack of theoretical models to also account for strategic interaction
in general equilibrium.
The following simple observation offers a sufficient motivation in adopting a model with
strategic interaction. Consider the U.S., one of the largest and most diversified economies in
the world, and look at the four-firm and eight-firm concentration ratios (CR4 and CR8, respec-
tively), namely the aggregate market share of the four and eight largest firms in a (disaggregate)
sector. As common in literature, let us focus on manufacturing sectors (NAICS 31-33). Beyond
the well-known textbook examples,2 a simple overall valuation of market concentration over
sectors can better set the scene. There are 181 out of 471 sectors (total number of sectors at
six-digit 2007 NAICS codes) with a CR4 higher than 50% and 292 sectors with a CR8 higher
than 50%. Yet, only 19 sectors have a CR4 lower than 10%.3 It would be easy for the reader
to find similar evidences on strong market concentrations for other countries, especially for the
developing ones. Putting aside questions on the accuracy on concentration ratios as proxies
2Such as the “Automobile manufacturing” (NAICS 336111) with a CR4 equal to 67.6%, or the “Tire manufac-
turing”(NAICS 32621) with a CR4 equal to 72.8%,
3Data are from the 2007 U.S. Economic Census Concentration Ratios. Market shares are relative to the value
of shipments. Author’s own calculations.
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for market power and competitiveness, this sketchy observation highlights how many (man-
ufacturing) markets are far to be represented by perfect or monopolistic competition because
oligopolistic rents are likely to be positive and large.
Hence, analyzing the implications of several sectors composed by a small number of large
firms having heterogeneous productivities and most likely engaging in a strategic competition
within their sectors, is far from being a theoretical curiosity but it is a worthwhile question that
needs further consideration. Surprisingly, so far this has not been done in any general equi-
librium framework. The aim of this paper is to meet this theoretical need by investigating the
following research question: what is the role of within-sector firm heterogeneities in affect-
ing wage rate, country-wide aggregate profits (henceforth simply aggregate profits), and social
welfare in a general equilibrium model under oligopoly? This paper achieves its purpose by
building on the Neary (2003b;c)’s framework of general oligopolistic equilibrium (henceforth
GOLE), and by augmenting it to allow for situations in which sectors may be asymmetric in
terms of average productivity requirements and they are composed by n Cournot oligopolists
producing horizontally differentiated varieties with constant, though asymmetric, costs. This
framework is able to generate a measure of the average within-sector firm heterogeneity, which
I use to derive new theoretical insights.
The main theoretical contribution of this paper is to link the first uncentred moment of
the cross-sector distribution of within-sector firm heterogeneities — measured as within-sector
variances of production costs — and the endogenous wage rate. This link permits to obtain gen-
eral equilibrium feedbacks on aggregate profits and social welfare. The findings of this paper
are summarized as follows. On the one hand, the first uncentred moment of the cross-sector dis-
tribution of within-sector firm heterogeneities unambiguously and negatively affects the wage
rate. The economic intuition for this finding relies on standard partial equilibrium models of
oligopoly without free entry. It is well-known that market power is indirectly linked to the mar-
ket concentration, which is positively and closely related to the variance in firms’ production
costs. In a framework with a continuum of sectors as that presented here, the first uncentred
moment of the cross-sector distribution of within-sector firm heterogeneities measures the “av-
erage” within-sector firm heterogeneity. Hence, the lower this “average” the more likely that
incumbents engage in a stronger competition in their sectors, and they would be more disposed
to pay a higher wage rate, putting pressure on labor demand. On the other hand, the endoge-
nous determinacy of the wage rate, together with the moments of the technology distribution of
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unit labor requirements (henceforth simply technology distribution) and demand parameters,
contribute in obtaining unclear findings of the impact of the “average” within-sector firm het-
erogeneity on aggregate profits and social welfare, depending on specific structure of the whole
economy.
My approach provides a new viewpoint on antitrust and related policies (e.g., those helping
minor firms) in comparison with those implied from standard partial equilibrium models, which
only focus on single sectors. The model qualifies the standard vision on competition policies
deriving from partial equilibrium works. Specifically, applying the intuitions from partial equi-
librium approaches to the economy as a whole might bring misleading results, as the effects on
aggregate profits and social welfare depend on features of all sectors in a country and on how
these sectors interact with factor markets. The bottom line for policy implications is the follow-
ing. Antitrust or, more generally, governmental authorities aiming to maximize social welfare
ought to posses an economy-wide standpoint on their policies, without overlooking potential
general equilibrium feedbacks from factor markets.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly discusses the background,
which motivates and justifies my formulation, and it presents an overview of the theoretical
contribution as well as the related literature. In Section 3 I build a model of within-sector firm
heterogeneities in the GOLE framework. Section 4 provides exercises of comparative statics,
states theoretical findings, and discusses them. Finally, in Section 5 I give some concluding
remarks and I suggest policy implications as well as some promising extensions of the model.
2 Background, overview, and related literature
Monopolistic competition is the standard tool in many strands of economic literature, such as
international trade, economic geography, macroeconomics, or economic growth. The reason is
that this market structure permits to have a highly tractable framework to embed imperfect com-
petition in general equilibrium.4 Literature on firm heterogeneity has not been prevented from
this approach.5 However, in a world characterized by the presence of a handful of large firms in
4For further discussion on monopolistic competition and its use on various economic fields, see the survey of
the literature by Chang (2011).
5For example, New New Trade Theory considers firm heterogeneity in general equilibrium by sticking with
the conventional use of monopolistic competition of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) to explain selection process in
international markets. This closes the strategic interaction channel. Firm heterogeneity has been also embedded in
the Eaton and Kortum (2002)’s Ricardian trade model by Bernard et al. (2003), in which Bertrand competition is
among firms producing the same variety, with markups endogenously determined. Holmes et al. (2012) consider a
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many (disaggregated) sectors, models relying on monopolistic competition, usually with con-
stant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences, are not adequate, or at best incomplete, given
the empirical evidence. Firms differ in size and the largest ones (that are also able to go to inter-
national markets) are most likely to engage in strategic behavior because their weights within
their sectors are far from zero. Moreover, with monopolistic competition and CES demand,
firms’ prices are not affected by firms’ market shares because markups are assumed to be a
constant multiple of marginal cost.6 Hence, the omnipresent skewness of firm productivity in
real-world economic activity, in which few large firms dominate markets, is blunt by consider-
ing – using Neary (2009b)’s words (p. 241, emphasis added) – “atomistic firms of monopolistic
competition, which never earn profits in equilibrium, take the demand functions they face as
given, and do not interact strategically with their competitors.” The importance of oligopoly is
highlighted in standard theory of industrial organization, and its relevance becomes greater as
firms’s efficiencies are not only heterogeneous but also skew.
Motivated by the empirical evidence and by the lack of theoretical models to account for
it in general equilibrium, I propose a simple model of strategic interaction and within-sector
firm heterogeneities, by building on a framework characterized by a continuum of asymmet-
ric sectors, each involving n firms having asymmetric costs of production and competing on
quantity (i.e., a` la Cournot). As in standard frameworks of monopolistic competition, and as
widely observed in most sectors, I also consider horizontally differentiated goods in order to
have a model that advances the realism, and it is more justifiable in a non-cooperative interac-
tion environment without collusion, as good differentiation helps to hold market power. Large
firms in a sector most likely remain active for a long time, therefore I work up with an ex-
ogenously fixed small number of active firms within each sector. The exogenous asymmetries
across sectors in average productivities overcome in a simple way the assumption that each
sector is composed by the same number n of active firms, permitting to consider differences in
degree of competition across sectors. This paper is not the first study that considers firm het-
erogeneity in oligopoly. This setting has been intensively analyzed in past partial equilibrium
literature (e.g., Lahiri and Ono (1988), and Kimmel (1992)). However, to my knowledge, no
version of the Bernard et al. (2003)’s model with a finite number of firms. See also Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2010) for a model of industry-level external economies of scale and trade, assuming Bertrand competition with
a continuum of sectors and wage as nume´raire. In general, (homogeneous-product) Bertrand competition with its
undercutting process is more akin to monopolistic competition with free entry than to Cournot competition, which
easily permits to take into account oligopolistic rents in equilibrium instead.
6Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) have partially overcome this limiting feature by using monopolistic competition
with quasi-linear preferences. Yet, strategic interaction has been put aside.
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paper has studied the implications for wage rate, aggregate profits, and social welfare of within-
sector firm heterogeneities together oligopolistic competition in a full general equilibrium, yet
simple, framework with many asymmetric sectors in term of average firm productivity.
As firms in each sector have different productivities as well as sectors differ in their aver-
age productivities, this is likely to affect factor rewards, once one aggregates over all sectors,
because the competition within sectors influences the demand from firms for the same scarce
input, by means of the strategic interaction. Most of theoretical literature on firm heterogeneity,
however, does not consider the implication from factor markets.7 To address factor markets,
a general equilibrium approach is needed. Neary (2003b;c) offers a theoretically consistent
framework overcoming the difficulties to embed oligopoly in general equilibrium. The Neary’s
key assumption is that firms are large in their own sector, but small for the economy as a whole.
In what follows, I build on his (GOLE) approach, which relies on a continuum of sectors and
an exogenous and small number of firms competing a` la Cournot within their sectors. Hence,
firms have sectoral market power, which permits them to affect the price of their output, so
that they strategically act only with respect to their direct rivals within their sectors, but they
take factor prices, other goods prices, and national income as given (viz., there exist neither
monopsony power nor Ford effect). Differently from Neary (2003b;c), who assumes homoge-
neous products and symmetric costs among firms within sectors, I augment his framework by
considering both firm heterogeneity in productivities within sectors and differentiated products.
It is reasonable to expect that these two extensions are more likely to be fulfilled in reality. In
a theoretical framework that encompasses both within-sector firm heterogeneities and strategic
interaction, I show how the wage rate plays a pivotal role because it affects all firms in the same
way, via the perfectly competitive labor market and its general equilibrium feedbacks.
The key difference between most of literature on firm heterogeneity in general equilib-
rium and my paper relies on the market structure, because I work with Cournot competition,
therefore the framework presented in this paper can be seen as complementary to models that
consider monopolistic or Bertrand competition. I have sought to show how the interaction
among labor market, oligopolistic market structure and firm heterogeneity in productivity can
also have an important role to better understand antitrust (or competition) policy outcomes.
To keep the analysis simple and to improve both understanding and intuition of the model,
I assume that demand and cost functions are linear, permitting to work up with closed-form
7For example, by normalizing factor reward to unity assuming a sector under perfect competition and constant
returns to scale, whose good acts as nume´raire (viz., one unit of input produces one unit of nume´raire good).
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equations. These key features allow for providing a fairly general, yet highly tractable, model,
to my knowledge the first theoretical study with these characteristics, and it can be used for
exercises of comparative statics. The model generates testable predictions on the link between
a measure of the average of within-sector firm heterogeneities and the wage rate, and once the
technology distribution is plausibly parametrized and calibrated (this step is left to future re-
search), the model would also give indications on the sign variations in aggregate profits and
social welfare due to a rise in the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity.
This paper relates to the economic literature and extends it in several ways, showing how my
model is able to unify a fairly broad set of research. Firstly, from a methodological viewpoint it
is related to the recent stream of literature using the Neary (2003b;c)’s GOLE framework. This
literature focuses on various topics, primarily linked to international trade issues.8 Bastos and
Straume (2012) build a GOLE model considering endogenous (horizontal) product differenti-
ation whereas Neary and Tharakan (2012) deal with an exogenous differentiation. However,
these papers consider only two varieties of a good in an international duopoly approach, with-
out focusing on the role of within-sector firm heterogeneities in general equilibrium. Egger and
Koch (2012) also set up a GOLE model with exogenous product differentiation to analyze the
implications on employment issues. As the previous two papers, no room is given to within-
sector firm heterogeneities. Partial exceptions dealing with different firm productivities can be
found in Eckel and Neary (2010) and Eckel et al. (2011) in studying multi-product firms. Both
studies consider an extension of their original models to allow for firm heterogeneity but they
go to another directions, as the authors are mainly interested in analyzing both scale and scope
intra-firm adjustments due to various shocks among multi-product firms in partial equilibrium,
and the consequent link with labor market. Yet, a full general equilibrium account of the ef-
fects of within-sector firm heterogeneities is not offered. My paper analyses yet another topic,
by proposing in an unified framework asymmetric sectors composed by n firms with different
productivities in producing horizontal differentiated varieties, by giving closed-form solutions
for wage rate, aggregate profits, and social welfare. Hence, my findings and the mechanisms
behind them lead to new insights. Given the increasing importance of the GOLE framework
in theoretical literature, the research question on the role of firm heterogeneity, which is a key
8See, for example, Neary (2003a;b) and Neary (2009a) for Ricardian trade models; Eckel and Neary (2010),
Eckel et al. (2011) and Egger and Koch (2012) for multi-product firms; Bastos and Straume (2012) and Neary
and Tharakan (2012) for wage inequality and skill-premium; Neary (2007) for cross-border mergers; Basile and
De Benedictis (2008), Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009), Egger and Etzel (2012), Egger and Koch (2012), Egger
and Meland (2011), and Kreickemeier and Meland (2011) for unions and unemployment.
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feature for most of sectors in many countries, is worth being analyzed. I aim to mitigate this
theoretical void.9
Secondly, this paper is theoretically related to, but differs from, the IO literature focusing
on the link between asymmetric costs in oligopoly and both sectoral total profits and welfare.
Partial equilibrium models of oligopoly with firms having heterogeneous productivities permit
to analyze market concentration issues, by means of the positive relationship between price-
marginal cost margins and market shares. It is a common wisdom that market concentration
is negatively related to welfare. However, comparative statics on the rise in cost dispersion
has showed that welfare-enhancing effects may also be derived. For asymmetric-costs Cournot
competition in different theoretical contexts, Long and Soubeyran (1997; 2001) and Salant and
Shaffer (1999) have showed that there exists a positive link between a rise of marginal cost
dispersion between firms and both sectoral total profits and welfare when the average marginal
cost of firms in the sector is not affected and all firms continue to be active after that their costs
change.10 All these studies focus on the effects of a cost variation within a single sector. They
do not consider, however, any link with factor markets, therefore they cannot account for the
effect of a country-level measure of within-sector firm heterogeneities and general equilibrium
feedbacks from factor rewards. Hence, all this literature leaves an open question on the formal
assessment of changes in welfare and aggregate profits in general equilibrium. Considering
these additional features leads to unclear results for the economy as whole, as this paper will
show.
Finally, the paper is also linked to another strand of research in IO. An established theoreti-
cal finding, addressed in an asymmetric-costs oligopoly, derives from the argument that helping
minor (i.e., inefficient) firms may reduce welfare, since the seminal work by Lahiri and Ono
(1988). This partial equilibrium literature has focused on several related issues: for example,
the effect of an exogenous variation in the sector-wide cost component on profits of single firms
(e.g., Kimmel (1992)) or the effect of an exogenous variation in a single firm’s production cost
on sectoral total profits and welfare (for models with linear demand see, e.g., Zhao (2001) for
an homogeneous good, and Wang and Zhao (2007) for a differentiated good). These works
have provided conditions on single firms’ market shares to assess the impact on sectoral total
profits and welfare due to changes in production costs. These and many other akin issues have
9Neary (2002) uses the n-firm asymmetric-costs differentiated-good in a partial equilibrium analysis of strate-
gic investments. He suggests in passing that future research should address a possible extension by using the
GOLE framework.
10See the seminal work by Bergstrom and Varian (1985a;b) for the insight.
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been investigated via partial equilibrium frameworks. Shedding some light on these topics, by
adopting an extended version of the GOLE framework, it would permit a better understanding
of antitrust and related policy outcomes.
3 Model
Before building the model in detail, I briefly describe the model features. The model strategy
nests two key distinct characteristics. On the demand side, I assume a representative consumer
having preferences over horizontally differentiated goods in a linear demand structure, a frame-
work widely used in IO literature, like in Dixit (1979) and extended by Vives (1985) to allow
for n firms producing a single variety each. On the supply side, I consider a linear technology
with constant, though asymmetric, marginal costs among firms within their own sector (e.g.,
as in partial equilibrium studies by Lahiri and Ono (1988) and Long and Soubeyran (1997;
2001)).11 I set up a simple and static Cournot oligopoly model, by presenting equilibrium
outcomes for a single representative sector. The model considers labor as the sole factor of
production, whose market is perfectly competitive. I use this framework to extend the GOLE
model by Neary (2003b;c) by giving an equilibrium closed-form solution to the wage rate. The
wage rate allows for deriving closed-form solutions, in term of exogenous variables only, for
aggregate profits and social welfare in general equilibrium. On these two variables I conduct
exercises of comparative statics in the next section. Continuity and differentiability in relevant
arguments will be assumed for the introduced functions up to the necessary order. I present
the model only for a closed (or autarky) economy. Generalization to an open-economy case, in
which domestic firms engage in strategic competition with their foreign rivals in each sector,
can be achieved with a heavier notation. Further discussion and implications on extending the
model to an open-economy case are provided in Section 5.
3.1 Demand side
The country is populated by a representative consumer endowed with L units of labor, inelasti-
cally supplied (for a positive wage rate) to a perfectly competitive labor market.12 Preferences
11This partial equilibrium setting of oligopoly with a representative consumer having linear demand is well-
know in literature since Vives (1985). For the sake of the reader, I briefly sketch the standard derivations for the
basic setup for the supply side and partial equilibrium from which I depart.
12A perfectly competitive labor market is plausible if a continuum of sectors compete for labor supply.
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are given by an utility function additively separable over a continuum of sectors13 of unit mass,
indexed by z ∈ [0, 1], strictly increasing and strictly concave, given by
(1) U [{x(z)}] =
∫ 1
0
u[x(z)]dz ,
assuming u′[·] > 0 and u′′[·] < 0. Let the sub-utility functions be quadratic, involving n ≥ 2
symmetrically14 and horizontally differentiated varieties of each good z, given by
(2) u[x(z)] = a
n∑
i=1
x(i, z)− b− γ
2
n∑
i=1
[x(i, z)]2 − γ
2
(
n∑
i=1
x(i, z)
)2
,
with a > 0 and b > γ ≥ 0. Let x(z) and x(i, z) in Eq. (2) denote the consumption of good
produced in sector z and the consumption of the variety i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} produced in sector
z, respectively. I additionally assume that the good produced in each sector is not substitutable
with those of any other sector.15
The interpretation of the demand parameters is borrowed by Ottaviano et al. (2002). The
higher a the higher maximum willingness to pay. The parameter a is constant both across any
two varieties in each sector and across sectors. Hence, the model considers only horizontal
differentiation, to focus on heterogeneity among firm productivities, abstracting from product
quality (or vertical differentiation), implying that all inverse demand functions share the inter-
cept.16 The higher b the more the consumer is bias towards a dispersed consumption of varieties
(i.e., love of variety). As usual in most studies on oligopoly, I abstract from complementarity,
by setting γ ≥ 0. To have love of variety I have set γ < b (Ottaviano et al., 2002). These
assumptions guarantee strictly concave sub-utility functions and interior solutions. The γ-to-
b ratio measures the degree of horizontal differentiation (or substitutability) between any two
13From an empirical viewpoint, in a GOLE setting, sectors can be interpretable as corresponding to a high level
of disaggregation of commodities applied in economic censuses, such as five-digit NAICS codes, or even more.
14Here symmetry means that all varieties of any good enter into each sub-utility function in the same way. Note
that I have assumed a bounded set of varieties for each good.
15These preferences have the advantage to give closed-form outcomes with linear demands in own prices and
quantities, so that they can approximate market outcomes in the neighborhood of their equilibriums. Moreover,
these preferences guarantee existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in any sector, with downward-sloping
reaction functions of firms in quantity space, namely the outputs are strategic substitutes, as required by Cournot
competition. Quadratic preferences are quasi-homothetic (viz., they are a case of Gorman (1961)’s polar form),
and they can be aggregated across individuals with different incomes, as long as they share the demand param-
eter b, implying linear and parallel Engel curves (Neary, 2003c; 2009a). This feature allows for adopting the
representative consumer approach.
16The model is isomorphic to that in which one allows for different values of a for any variety of each good, as
it can be easily brought back to the present case by deviating any small quality effect on production cost as long
as all firms are active (viz., isomorphism holds for sufficiently small differences among product qualities).
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varieties, ranging from zero (γ = 0: independent) to approximately one (γ ≈ b: almost ho-
mogeneous or perfect substitutes). To keep mathematical simplicity, I assume that, as for the
parameter a, the parameter γ is constant for any pair of varieties of a good in each sector and
invariant across sectors. This is done to avoid including another source of heterogeneity.
The representative consumer maximizes the utility function in Eq. (1) subject to the budget
constraint:
(3) max
{x(z)}∈Rn+, i∈{1,...,n}, z∈[0,1]
U [{x(z)}] s.t.
∫ 1
0
n∑
i=1
p(i, z)x(i, z)dz ≤ I ,
with I the income (or total expenditure) in the economy, and p(i, z) the price of variety x(i, z).
Solving the problem17 in Eq. (3) gives the linear inverse demand function for the interior
optimal consumption of x(i, z):
(4) λp(i, z) = a− bx(i, z)− γ
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
x(j, z) , i = 1, . . . , n ,
with λ the Lagrangian multiplier of the budget constraint (or the marginal utility of income). I
assume throughout that p(i, z) > 0 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and non satiation (that is, λ > 0). This
guarantees a strictly positive demand for each variety produced, meaning that all varieties are
essential at any (finite) positive price. As γ < b, the inverse demand functions in Eq. (4) can
be inverted as
(5) x(i, z) = A− λBp(i, z) + λC
∑
j=1
j 6=i
p(j, z) , i = 1, . . . , n ,
where A = a
b+γ(n−1) , B =
b+γ(n−2)
(b+γ(n−1))(b−γ) , and C =
γ
(b+γ(n−1))(b−γ) .
For sake of completeness, before concluding the demand side of the model, I derive the
closed-form expression for the marginal utility of national income. I rewrite the direct demand
functions in Eq. (5) as
(6) x(i, z) = A− λ(B + C)p(i, z) + λCnp¯(z) , i = 1, . . . , n ,
17The first order conditions for utility maximization are both necessary and sufficient given the strict concavity
of sub-utility functions.
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with p¯(z) = n−1
∑n
i=1 p(i, z). By multiplying each direct demand function in Eq. (6) for its
price, p(i, z), yields
(7) x(i, z)p(i, z) = Ap(i, z)− λ(B + C)[p(i, z)]2 + λCnp¯(z)p(i, z) .
Eq. (7) is the expenditure on the variety i of good z. Then, by summing up Eq. (7) for all
varieties produced in sector z, and integrating over all sectors, it gives the total expenditure in
the economy as a whole, which has to equal the national income, I , by assuming the saturation
of the budget constraint in Eq. (3):
(8)
∫ 1
0
{
n∑
i=1
x(i, z)p(i, z)
}
dz = Anµp¯1 − λ(B + C)nµσ
2
p
1 − λ(B + C)nµp¯2 + λCn2µp¯2 = I ,
where
(9) µp¯1 ≡
∫ 1
0
p¯(z)dz , µp¯2 ≡
∫ 1
0
[p¯(z)]2dz , µ
σ2p
1 ≡
∫ 1
0
σ2p(z)dz ,
and σ2p(z) =
{
(
∑n
i=1[p(i, z)]
2) /n− [p¯(z)]2}, which is the price variance in sector z. The first
two terms in Eq. (9) are the first and the second uncentred moments of the distribution across
sectors of the average price in each sector, respectively. The third term is the first uncentred
moment of the distribution across sectors of the price variance in each sector.
I can now solve Eq. (8) for the marginal utility of national income, λ, as
λ[{p(z)}, I] = Anµ
p¯
1 − I
n
{
(B + C)µ
σ2p
1 + µ
p¯
2(B − C(n− 1))
}
=
[
aµp¯1 − I b+γ(n−1)n
]
(b− γ)
(b+ γ(n− 1))µσ2p1 + (b− γ)µp¯2
.
(10)
The marginal utility of national income is endogenous in general equilibrium and it does not
depend on sector-level variables but on the economy-wide variables only: price distribution and
national income (and, of course, demand parameters and the exogenous number of varieties,
which is common across all sectors). The marginal utility of national income in Eq. (10) is
negatively related, all other things being equal, with a rise in national income, a rise in the
second uncentred moment of the distribution across sectors of the average price in each sector,
µp¯2, a rise in the first uncentred moment of the distribution across sectors of the price variance
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in each sector, µ
σ2p
1 , and a fall in the first uncentred moment of the distribution across sectors of
the average price in each sector, µp¯1.
18 I move now to analyze firms’ behaviors, technology, and
the partial equilibrium.
3.2 Supply side and partial equilibrium
As in the traditional literature on oligopoly models, I assume that each sector is composed by
an exogenously fixed and small number n of firms,19 and, for analytical tractability, each firm
in any sector produces a distinct variety, namely there exists a bijective (i.e., one-to-one) rela-
tion between firms and varieties.20 Hence, each firm faces a positive demand for its produced
variety. Focusing on oligopolistic market structure and competition among incumbents, I keep
any firm entry-and-exit process out from the study, therefore this framework can be used for
short and medium run analyses or, more generally, for situations in which changes in variables
are not enough to permit any firm entrance or exit. The lack of free entry in the model can be
motivated with the evidence that in many markets there are few large firms that for long periods
of time have positive profit margins (see, e.g., Cubbin and Geroski (1987), Friedman (1993)
and Leahy and Neary (2010)) and for the high entry barriers or the difficulty faced by new
entrants in surviving long as argued by Geroski (1995), who also highlights how firm entry has
a modest effect in eroding average industry profits.21 Moreover, the exit may not occur if firms
18Note that if µ
σ2p
1 = 0 (i.e., no heterogeneity within any sector) and γ tends to b (i.e., goods almost perfect
substitutes) then
lim
γ→b
(
λ[{p(z)}, I]
∣∣∣∣
µ
σ2p
1 =0
)
=
aµp¯1 − bI
µp¯2
.
Thus the marginal utility of national income degenerates to that of the baseline model by Neary (2003b;c), in
which within every sector each firm charges the same price.
19The assumption of an equal number n of firms in each sector might seem strong, not allowing for different
competition levels across sectors. I continue, however, to represent different competition levels within sectors by
considering cross-sector asymmetries in terms of average firm productivities, given the strategic environment in
each sector.
20For the paper’s purpose, I abstract from multi-product (or multi-variety) firms, focusing on the scale changes
in firm productions as a whole. There exists empirical evidence showing that large firms tend to have power-law
distributed business lines, with only some key products composing most of sale shares (see, e.g., Sutton (2002)
for a general discussion).
21Free entry condition allows for sectors with many (or an infinite number of) firms, driving profits to zero (ig-
noring the integer problem), and equilibrium outcomes converge to those of monopolistic or perfect competition.
See Zhou (2010) for a model of homogeneous-good oligopoly and international trade, focusing on the entry-and-
exit process of heterogeneous firms a` la Melitz (2003). In his model, free entry leads expected profits to zero,
and the opening up to trade leads inefficient firms out of the market, like in a model of monopolistic competition,
although this entry-and-exit process is not due to the increase in the number of varieties supplied by the most
efficient firms, but to a decrease in prices while the set of varieties is not changed. On a similar research line, see
also Bekkers and Francois (2008), who extend the Brander and Krugman (1983)’s segmented-market model to a
general equilibrium framework, by allowing for a finite number of sectors, offering also an interesting solution to
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were to pay sunk costs, excluding drastic economic situations, which can be put aside as I work
“around” the equilibrium (Negishi, 1961), in order to justify the use of the GOLE. I appeal also
to the robust empirical evidence that big firms have a higher probability to remain active in the
medium run.
I assume away any capacity constraint. Firms play a static one-stage game with complete
information. They compete a` la Cournot in their respective sectors, by choosing their own
profit-maximizing outputs, taking the rivals’ aggregate output as given. The GOLE approach
relies on the assumption that firms are large in their own sector but small with respect to the
economy as a whole (Neary, 2003b;c), so that firms take λ as given in their production decisions
because they are not able to affect national income, wage rate, and firms’ prices in the other
sectors. Hence, the perceived inverse demand functions are linear within a neighborhood of
the equilibrium (Negishi, 1961). This assumption avoids the problem of monopsony power in
build model of oligopoly in general equilibrium.22
Labor, L, is the only factor of production. Labor can freely move across all sectors with
no cost, therefore all firms in the country face the same wage rate. Firms are heterogeneous
in their productivities and operate under a technology with constant returns to scale, therefore
each cost function is linear in the output. As the number of firms is exogenously given, the
fixed (sunk) costs have no role (provided firms gain positive profits). Thus, I set the fixed costs
equal to zero. Each firm requires a different amount of labor to produce one unit of output,
therefore firms differ in their marginal costs c(i, z) for i = 1, . . . , n, and z ∈ [0, 1]. Each firm
maximizes its own profits subject to the perceived inverse demand function in Eq. (4), taking
the direct rivals’ outputs as given:
(11) max
y(i,z)∈R+ , i=1,...,n , z∈[0,1]
pi(i, z) ≡ [p(i, z)− c(i, z)]y(i, z) ,
with y(i, z) the output of firm i in sector z. Linear cost and demand functions guarantee stability
and uniqueness of Cournot–Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, where firms do not deviate
unilaterally from the equilibrium.
the integer problem for small-group models. Both papers emphasize reallocation effects due to the firm entry-and-
exit process. However, they do not derive any link with the labor market, by normalizing the wage rate as well as
no implication is derived from the nexus between with-sector firm heterogeneities and welfare. Neary (2010) puts
forward some suggestions to embed firm entry-and-exit process in oligopolistic models.
22There are, of course, some real-world cases in which firms are able to influence the national-wide variables.
The GOLE approach abstracts from such cases. This approach is justified as many modern developed economies
are well diversified, so that sectors are relatively small with respect to the economy as a whole.
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As standard in studies using the GOLE approach, I set λ = 1. This does not affect the
model implications (in reality the absolute value of λ is not determined).23 Hence, in general
equilibrium nominal variables are measured in terms of the inverse of the marginal utility of
national income (i.e., real at the margin).24 As variables at the margin behave like the real ones,
this setting can provide theoretical insights.
By imposing market clearing condition for each variety, the first order conditions for the
firm’s problem in Eq. (11) give the best response function for each firm in sector z:
(12) y(i, z) =
1
2b
a− γ n∑
j=1
j 6=i
y(j, z)− c(i, z)
 , i = 1, . . . , n .
It can be checked that the second order conditions for interior solutions are satisfied. By using
the usual trick to sum up all first order conditions in Eq. (12) over i = 1, . . . , n, one obtains
2bQ(z) = na − γ(n − 1)Q(z) −∑ni=1 c(i, z), with Q(z) = ∑ni=1 y(i, z). Solving for Q(z)
yields the Cournot–Nash equilibrium sectoral total production Q(z)CN :25
(13) Q(z)CN =
n(a− c¯(z))
2b+ γ(n− 1) ,
with a > c¯(z) and c¯(z) = n−1
∑n
i=1 c(i, z). The superscript CN refers to Cournot–Nash
equilibrium outcomes.
The Cournot–Nash equilibrium supply of each firm is obtained as solution of simultaneous
equations derived by each firm’s best response function in Eq. (12):
y(i, z) +
γ
2b
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
y(j, z) =
a− c(i, z)
2b
, i = 1, . . . , n .
23Real variables are homogeneous of degree zero in the wage rate and 1/λ. This fact provides a solution to the
well-known nume´raire problem. See Neary (2003b;c) and Neary (2009a) for further discussion.
24See Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) on the nume´raire problem for oligopoly models in general equilibrium.
25Sectoral total output only depends on c¯(z), not on the distribution of costs among firms in the sector. Hence, a
mean-preserving cost change (e.g., a productivity shock) is not able to affectQ(z)CN . This is a well-known result,
which dates back to Dixit and Stern (1982). See also the widely cited work by Bergstrom and Varian (1985a;b)
and Katz (1986). This result is valid if, as here, all firms have the same “conjectural variations” (viz., for Cournot
competition, zero conjectural elasticity for each firm) and an interior equilibrium is considered.
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Hence, the supply of firm i in sector z in Cournot–Nash equilibrium is given by
(14) y(i, z)CN =
a− c(i, z)
2b− γ −
γn(a− c¯(z))
(2b− γ)(2b+ γ(n− 1)) , i = 1, . . . , n .
Differently from models of monopolistic competition, firms in each sector consider the sectoral
total output in Eq. (13) in taking their own decisions. I assume throughout only interior solu-
tions in equilibrium, in which all firms have strictly positive supplies (as I have assumed that
each firm faces a positive demand), namely all firms are active in equilibrium, that is y(i, z) > 0
for i = 1, . . . , n and z ∈ [0, 1].26 This is equivalent to the following assumption.
Assumption 1.
c(i, z) < a− γn(a− c¯(z))
2b+ γ(n− 1) , i = 1, . . . , n , for each z ∈ [0, 1] .
Assumption 1 means that unit labor requirements of firms in any sector are not too large.
In this specification, every firm in any sector is able to charge a distinct price for its produced
variety, having a potential positive demand even though it does not charge the lowest price
(in case it faces a relatively high production cost). The corresponding Cournot–Nash equilib-
rium price, p(i, z)CN , can be obtained by plugging Eq. (14) into Eq. (4), and by imposing
y(i, z)CN = x(i, z):
(15) p(i, z)CN = by(i, z)CN + c(i, z) =
ba+ (b− γ)c(i, z)
2b− γ −
bγ
2b− γQ(z)
CN .
The Cournot–Nash equilibrium profits of any firm are given by the standard result in Cournot
competition: pi(i, z)CN = b
[
y(i, z)CN
]2.27 Firm i’s profit function (i = 1, . . . , n) is strictly
26This is a standard assumption in literature on asymmetric-costs oligopoly, abstracting from inactive firms.
Considering both active and inactive firms would extremely complicate the analysis.
27To see this, note that
y(i, z)CN =
1
2b− γ
(
a− c(i, z)− γQ(z)CN) ,
from Eq. (13). Therefore one can write the profit margin in Eq. (15) as p(i, z)CN − c(i, z) = by(i, z)CN , and by
using the expression for the inverse demand function in Eq. (4) as
by(i, z)CN = a− b
2b− γ
(
a− c(i, z)− γQ(z)CN)− γQ(z)CN + γ
2b− γ
(
a− c(i, z)− γQ(z)CN)− c(i, z)
=
(
1− b
2b− γ +
γ
2b− γ
)(
a− c(i, z)− γQ(z)CN) = b
2b− γ (2b− γ)y(i, z)
CN .
Profit margins are proportional to firm outputs, not to firm marginal costs as in monopolistic competition: the
more market share the more market power, which is directly linked to production costs. Operating profits equal
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decreasing in the direct rivals’ sectoral total output,
∑n
j 6=i y(j, z) for y(i, z) > 0, showing the
well-known competitive effect among incumbents.
I assume that any firm’s marginal cost depends on the wage rate, w > 0, and on a firm-
specific unit labor requirement β(i, z) ≥ 1.28 Thus I can simply write any firm unit cost as
c(i, z) = wβ(i, z) > 0. This completes the supply side of the model. In the next subsection I
consider the labor market as well as the general equilibrium.
3.3 Labor market and general equilibrium
Total wage income and aggregate profits are costlessly distributed to the representative con-
sumer, who uses them for the current consumption. This does not affect the generality of the
model. The national income is given by I = wL + Π, with Π ≡ ∫ 1
0
∑n
i=1 pi(i, z)dz the aggre-
gate profits. The model is closed by deriving the wage rate as a function of exogenous variables.
Full employment yields
(16) L =
∫ 1
0
n∑
i=1
β(i, z)y(i, z)dz .
Plugging into Eq. (16) the Cournot–Nash equilibrium production of each firm from Eq.
(14), then the firm unit cost, c(i, z) = wβ(i, z), and solving for wage rate, w, by evaluating the
integral in Eq. (16), yields
(17) w =
[
aµβ¯1 − L2b+γ(n−1)n
]
(2b− γ)
(2b+ γ(n− 1))µσ
2
β
1 + (2b− γ)µβ¯2
,
where
µβ¯1 ≡
∫ 1
0
β¯(z)dz , µβ¯2 ≡
∫ 1
0
[
β¯(z)
]2
dz , µ
σ2β
1 ≡
∫ 1
0
σ2β(z)dz .
The first two terms are the first and the second uncentred moments of the distribution across
sectors of the average of firm-level unit labor requirements in each sector, respectively. The
third term is the first uncentred moment of the distribution across sectors of the variance of
net profits because of zero fixed costs. Hence, more efficient firms (viz., those with lower unit labor requirements)
have larger both markups and outputs.
28I normalize the smallest unit labor requirement to unity.
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firm-level unit labor requirements in each sector, with
σ2β(z) =
[∑n
i=1 [β(i, z)]
2
n
− [β¯(z)]2] and β¯(z) = n−1 n∑
i=1
β(i, z) .
The variable of interest is µ
σ2β
1 and plays a crucial role in deriving all exercises of compar-
ative statics for the paper’s purpose.29 The reader can think of a series of productivity shocks
affecting firms within any sector, changing firm market shares and, thus, the within-sector vari-
ances of unit labor requirements. Thus via aggregation across sectors, these shocks are able to
affect µ
σ2β
1 . In doing so, I am not concerned about the origin of these shocks, however, through-
out the paper I refer to them as technology changes, in the understanding that they may come
from any other plausible sources as, for example, the management.30 I aim to explore what
happens to wage rate, aggregate profits, and social welfare when µ
σ2β
1 changes. In the following
exercises of comparative statics, in order to isolate the effects of µ
σ2β
1 , I take as given the other
two moments of the technology distribution. Furthermore Assumption 1 continues to hold after
that marginal cost dispersion in any sector changes (viz., no shock is able to drive any firm out
of the sector).
In the remaining of the paper, I also refer to µ
σ2β
1 as the “average” within-sector firm hetero-
geneity. This measure can be seen as complementary to what Lerner (1934) called “the degree
of monopoly” across all sectors. By using his words, one can see the “average” within-sector
firm heterogeneity as the “average degree of monopoly” within sectors.
Using the solution for the wage rate, it is possible to give closed-form solutions to the
endogenous variables of interest (i.e., aggregate profits and social welfare) in term of exogenous
variables. This is what I do in the next section in carrying out comparative statics.
29Neary (2003b;c) and Neary (2009a) looks also at the competition policy by increasing the number of
symmetric-costs firms within all sectors of the economy. The present framework is not suited for studying com-
petition policy because firms have heterogeneous productivities, therefore one cannot simply differentiate the
variables with respect to n (by ignoring the integer problem) because in my model the efficiencies of entrant firms
would matter.
30See Syverson (2011) for further discussion on the sources of productivity differences.
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4 The impact of the “average” within-sector firm heteroge-
neity
In this section I carry exercises of comparative statics of how the “average” within-sector firm
heterogeneity affects wage rate, aggregate profits, and social welfare. For the last two variables
of interest, I provide results with the wage rate treated as both exogenous (i.e., a parameter)
and endogenous (viz., the wage rate is a decreasing function of the “average” within-sector
firm heterogeneity). The findings are discussed and related to the partial equilibrium literature.
4.1 Wage rate
It is immediate to calculate comparative statics effects on the equilibrium wage rate. From
Eq. (17), as in Neary (2003b;c), the equilibrium wage rate is, all other things being equal,
decreasing in L and in µβ¯2 whereas it is increasing in µ
β¯
1 . The key feature of the model is that
the wage rate is unambiguously and negatively related to µ
σ2β
1 , the “average” within-sector firm
heterogeneity. From this new feature I derive theoretical insights of potential importance. The
following proposition formally states the effect of a rise in the “average” within-sector firm
heterogeneity on the wage rate.
Proposition 1. In a GOLE framework with firm heterogeneity within sectors, all other things
being equal, the higher the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity the lower the wage rate.
The economic intuition for Proposition 1 can be easily explained as follows. For Cournot
competition without free entry in a partial equilibrium framework, it is well-known that the
aggregate market power, as measured by the Lerner Index, is indirectly linked to the market
concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. This last index is positively
and closely related to the heterogeneity (i.e., the variance) in firms’ production costs (see,
e.g., Long and Soubeyran (1997; 2001) and Salant and Shaffer (1999)).31 Hence, in a multi-
sector framework, the lower the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity the more likely
the incumbents engage in a stronger competition within their sector, and they would be more
31Let L the (average) Lerner index (weighted by market shares) for an industry, H the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index of the same industry, and E the own price elasticity of market demand (in absolute value). For an homoge-
neous Cournot competition it holds that L = H/E . In case of a linear set up, L is directly linked to H. Note that,
however, for markets with horizontally differentiated goods, the interpretation of the sum of the squared market
shares as Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is not straight because of the potential differences in equilibrium prices of
varieties of the same good, so that preferences matter as well.
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disposed to pay a higher wage rate, putting pressure on labor demand. Stated in this simple
form, the economic intuition is clear even though it seems that the debate about antitrust and
related policies, by focusing on single-sector issues, has not carefully taken in consideration
such theoretical result.
It can be easily shown that the total labor demand in Eq. (16) is negatively related to the
“average” within-sector firm heterogeneity. This means that the more concentrated the markets
the less total labor demand coming from all sectors. Hence, the “average ”within-sector firm
heterogeneity can be interpreted as a country-level proxy for the average concentration within
sectors. Two additional corollaries to Proposition 1 are in order.
Corollary 1. In case all sectors are composed by firms with the same productivity in each
sector (i.e., within-sector firm homogeneities), then µ
σ2β
1 = 0 because there exists no dispersion
among firm-level unit labor requirements within each sector. Hence, the wage rate is lower
when one considers within-sector firm heterogeneities.
Note furthermore that Proposition 1 holds for any degree of horizontal differentiation
among good varieties. For the limiting case where varieties of goods are almost perfect substi-
tutes, one has the following result.32
Corollary 2. In case within-sector firm heterogeneities are not considered (that is, µ
σ2β
1 = 0),
and goods are almost perfect substitutes (that is, γ ≈ b), then the wage rate tends to that in the
Neary (2003b;c)’s model.
4.2 Aggregate profits
I next move on analyzing the Cournot–Nash equilibrium aggregate profits. They are given by
(18) ΠCN =
∫ 1
0
{
n∑
i=1
b
[
y(i, z)CN
]2}
dz =
b
(2b− γ)2(2b+ γ(n− 1))2 Φ ,
with
(19) Φ =
∫ 1
0
{
n∑
i=1
[
a(2b− γ)− wβ(i, z)(2b+ γ(n− 1)) + γnwβ¯(z)]2} dz .
32It is worthwhile to note, however, that the result in Corollary 2 is purely notional as one cannot invert the
inverse demand functions for γ = b. This remark also applies to the already discussed limiting case for the
marginal utility of national income in footnote 18 as well as to the following limiting cases for aggregate profits
and social welfare in footnotes 34 and 39, respectively.
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It is sufficient to focus on Eq. (19) as the first factor on the right hand side of Eq. (18) is a
positive constant. Straightforward calculations in Eq. (19) and rearranging33 yield
Φ = na2(2b− γ)2 + w2n
{
(2b+ γ(n− 1))2µσ
2
β
1 + (2b− γ)2µβ¯2
}
− 2wna(2b− γ)2µβ¯1 .
(20)
Now I am able to calculate the effect of the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity on ag-
gregate profits. The exercise of comparative statics is based on partially differentiating Eq. (20)
with respect to µ
σ2β
1 .
34
Consider firstly the effect of the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity on aggregate
profits when the general equilibrium feedback, which relies on the endogenous wage rate, is
not considered. Namely, let us parametrically treat the wage rate, considering it as exogenous
and, thus, constant. It is easy to see that
(21)
∂
(
Φ
∣∣
w exogenous
)
∂µ
σ2β
1
= w2n(2b+ γ(n− 1))2 > 0 .
Hence, as long as one takes the wage rate as given, aggregate profits are a linear and increasing
function of the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity. I call the derivative in Eq. (21) as
the direct effect of the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity on aggregate profits. This re-
sult relates to partial equilibrium literature on Cournot competition (e.g., Long and Soubeyran
(1997; 2001) and Salant and Shaffer (1999)). The economic intuition relies on the fact that
each firm’s profit function is convex decreasing in the exogenous marginal cost of production,
and in doing the exercise of comparative statics a mean-preserving variation in cost dispersion
in each sector has been considered. This fact is indirectly reflected in the assumed constancy
of the other two moments of the technology distribution.35 In all above papers, authors work
with a single-sector framework and an exogenous wage rate, and my model, when one con-
33For the derivation of Φ, a computational file is available from the author upon request.
34As for the wage rate, if µ
σ2β
1 = 0 and γ tends to b, then the aggregate profits degenerate to those of the Neary
(2003b;c)’s baseline model:
lim
γ→b
(
ΠCN
∣∣∣∣
µ
σ2
β
1 =0
)
=
n
b(n+ 1)2
(
a2 + w2µβ¯2 − 2waµβ¯1
)
.
35This finding relies on the Bergstrom and Varian (1985a;b)’s intuition: a mean-preserving increase in marginal
cost dispersion between Cournot oligopolists shrinks the sectoral production costs, and thus sectoral total profits
will strictly increase, whereas sectoral total output will not change, as long as all firms will continue to be active
after costs change.
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siders the wage rate as exogenous, can be simply seen as a continuum-of-sectors extension of
those partial equilibrium frameworks. This is the case as the production cost of any firm is
exogenous as both the wage rate and unit labor requirements (viz., the technology of any firm
is exogenous). Hence, even in a continuum-of-sectors general equilibrium framework, there
exists a positive link between the “cross-sector average market concentration” — as proxied
by the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity — and the (country-wide) aggregate profits,
as expected by antitrust authorities, as long as the wage rate is exogenously taken.
I turn next to consider the general equilibrium feedback. By treating the wage rate as
endogenous, I obtain the following derivative:36
∂
(
Φ
∣∣
w endogenous
)
∂µ
σ2β
1
= 2w
∂w
∂µ
σ2β
1
n
{
(2b+ γ(n− 1))2µσ
2
β
1 + (2b− γ)2µβ¯2
}
+ w2n(2b+ γ(n− 1))2 − 2na(2b− γ)2µβ¯1
∂w
∂µ
σ2β
1
.
(22)
The second term at the right hand side of Eq. (22) is the (positive) direct effect of the “aver-
age” within-sector firm heterogeneity on aggregate profits, as I have just seen in Eq. (21). From
Proposition 1 it follows that at the right hand side of Eq. (22), both the first and third terms are
negative. In general the sign of the derivative in Eq. (22) is indeterminate.
I can say a little bit more on this point. To better see the why of this unclear result on the
aggregate profits and trying to disentangle what generates it once the wage rate is treated as
endogenous, one can proceed as follows. Let us explicit L from Eq. (17):
(23) L =
[
aµβ¯1 − w
2b+ γ(n− 1)
2b− γ µ
σ2β
1 − wµβ¯2
]
n
2b+ γ(n− 1) ,
then it must be the case that the quantity within the square brackets at the right hand side of Eq.
(23) is positive for any L > 0. Then one can rewrite the first and third term in Eq. (22) as
∂
(
Φ
∣∣
w endogenous
)
∂µ
σ2β
1
− w2n(2b+ γ(n− 1))2 ≡ Z
36In order to economize the notation, I simply apply the Leibniz’s chain rule on the derivation of composed
functions.
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with
(24) Z = −2n ∂w
∂µ
σ2β
1
(2b− γ)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
[
aµβ¯1 − w
(
2b+ γ(n− 1)
2b− γ
)2
µ
σ2β
1 − wµβ¯2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+/0/−)
.
The product of the terms outside the square brackets is positive from Proposition 1. It is
easy to compare the quantities within the square brackets at the right hand side in Eqs. (23)
and (24). The indeterminacy of the sign of Eq. (22) is due to the coefficient multiplying wµ
σ2β
1
within the square brackets at the right hand side of Eq. (24): [(2b+ γ(n− 1))/(2b− γ)]2 > 1.
This coefficient is similar to that in Eq. (23) except it is raised to the power two. Hence, Z ≥ 0
if and only if
aµβ¯1 ≥ w
(
2b+ γ(n− 1)
2b− γ
)2
µ
σ2β
1 + wµ
β¯
2 .
I formally state this result.
Proposition 2. Consider the wage rate as endogenous in a GOLE framework with firm hetero-
geneity within sectors. If
aµβ¯1 ≥ w
(
2b+ γ(n− 1)
2b− γ
)2
µ
σ2β
1 + wµ
β¯
2 ,
then, all other things being equal, a rise in the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity has
a positive effect on aggregate profits.
If
w
(
2b+ γ(n− 1)
2b− γ
)2
µ
σ2β
1 + wµ
β¯
2 > aµ
β¯
1 > w
(
2b+ γ(n− 1)
2b− γ
)
µ
σ2β
1 + wµ
β¯
2 ,
then Z < 0 and, all other things being equal, a rise in the “average” within-sector firm het-
erogeneity has an unclear effect on aggregate profits, depending on the sign of the difference
w2n(2b+ γ(n− 1))− |Z|.
In principle it can be shown under what exact value combinations of economic structure
the impact on aggregate profits would be either positive, negative, or zero, but this exercise
would lead to somewhat cumbersome findings. Hence, I am not able to determine a clear-
cut finding for the effect of the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity on aggregate profits
because the sign of the derivative relies on the specific values of the moments of the technology
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distribution as well as demand parameters. This is a striking and new finding. I formally state
this theoretical indeterminacy as follows.
Corollary 3. In a GOLE framework with firm heterogeneities within sectors and wage rate
treated as endogenous, all other things being equal, a rise in the “average” within-sector firm
heterogeneity has not a clear-cut effect on aggregate profits, depending on the specific values
of the moments of the technology distribution as well as demand parameters.
As for the IO literature on the effect of cost changes on sectoral total profits (i.e., Kimmel
(1992), Zhao (2001), and Wang and Zhao (2007)), which depends on the firms’ market shares,
the analysis so far cannot establish any monotonic relationship. The indeterminacy of the sign
in Eq. (24) vanishes in case the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity is zero, namely in
every sector firms have the same productivity, so that the effect of a rise in the “average” within-
sector firm heterogeneity on aggregate profits would be positive.
Although I have not a clear quantitative finding, I may derive from Eq. (22) an additional
qualitative insight of some interest for the national income distribution. As long as there exist
value combinations of the moments of the technology distribution and demand parameters for
which the derivative in Eq. (22) is positive, a rise in the “average” within-sector firm heteroge-
neity is able to play a potential role on the distribution of national income between total wage
income and aggregate profits given the finding in Proposition 1. Note that this distributional
role of the “average” within-sector heterogeneity on the national income is clearly played when
the wage rate is treated as exogenous. I formally state this result in the following corollary.
Corollary 4. If there exist value combinations of the moments of the technology distribution
as well as demand parameters such that the derivative in Eq. (22) is positive, then, all other
things being equal, a rise in the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity can shrink the share
of total wages (or, equivalently, it can expand the share of aggregate profits) in the national
income.
A final comment is worthwhile. The value of Z in Eq. (24) is clearly positive if valued at
µ
σ2β
1 = 0. In this case the second term within the square brackets at the right hand side disap-
pears, by implying that Eq. (22) is positive as well. This shows how in a situation in which there
exists homogeneity in firm efficiencies in each sector, a marginal rise in the “average” within-
sector firm heterogeneity will increase aggregate profits even when the wage rate is treated as
endogenous. However, as already stated, for positive values of the “average” within-sector firm
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heterogeneity is no longer clear if a marginal rise in µ
σ2β
1 has a positive impact on aggregate
profits. The next subsection is devoted to take into account the normative side of the model, by
calculating the effect of the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity on social welfare.
4.3 Social welfare
As I have used the assumption of a representative consumer and the preferences are quasi-
homothetic, social welfare can be derived by means of the indirect utility function, by plugging
the direct demand functions for the varieties produced in each sector in Eq. (5) into the sub-
utility functions in Eq. (2), and by integrating over all sectors.37 Thus the indirect utility
function is given by
(25) U = K − λ2n
2
(
µp¯2
b+ γ(n− 1) +
µ
σ2p
1
b− γ
)
,
where K = na2/2(b+ γ(n− 1)) is a positive constant.
As before, I set λ = 1.38 Hence, I can focus on a monotonically transformed form of the
indirect utility function of Eq. (25) as given by
(26) V ≡ (U −K) 2
n
= −
(
µp¯2
(b+ γ(n− 1)) +
µ
σ2p
1
(b− γ)
)
.
The indirect utility function in Eq. (26) is negatively related not only to µp¯2, as in Neary
(2003b;c), but also to µ
σ2p
1 . Hence, the representative consumer dislikes both differences in
prices across sectors and, as expected, differences in prices within sectors. I state formally this
result.
Proposition 3. In a GOLE framework with firm heterogeneities within sectors, the representa-
tive consumer dislikes both differences in prices across sectors and differences in prices within
sectors.
37For the derivation of the indirect utility function, a computational file is available from the author upon request.
38Hence, the marginal utility of national income is hold constant when I analyze the social welfare. This
assumption may sound strong because of its meaning of no income effect. However, by recalling that the GOLE
framework relies on the Negishi (1961)’s perceived demand function, which gives a good approximation around
the equilibrium, this assumption is plausible and also convenient permitting to economize on the mathematical
notation. In calculating the indirect utility function, this simplification is standard in GOLE literature dealing with
welfare issues. See Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009), Bastos and Straume (2012), Egger and Etzel (2012), Egger
and Meland (2011), Kreickemeier and Meland (2011), and Neary (2003b;c).
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An additional observation is worthwhile. It is straightforward to see how the second term
within the parentheses at the right hand side of Eqs. (26) tends to increase when γ becomes
larger. This fact means that as varieties become more homogeneous, there exists a stronger
negative effect on social welfare of the within-sector price heterogeneities as proxied by µ
σ2p
1 .
For completeness, I formally state this result.39
Proposition 4. In a GOLE framework with firm heterogeneities with sectors, as varieties be-
come more homogeneous, there exists a stronger negative effect on social welfare of the within-
sector price heterogeneities.
The rationale for this result derives from the assumption that all varieties of any good are
essential. As varieties become more homogeneous, the willingness to pay different prices for
close varieties have a larger cost in terms of utility.
Before proceeding further, it is useful to derive explicitly the two moments of the price
distribution in Eq. (26), in terms of the moments of the technology distribution. The closed-
form solutions for the moments of the price distribution will come in handy for the exercises
of comparative statics on social welfare. To do so, I use the formulation for the Cournot–Nash
equilibrium price in Eq. (15) to calculate the Cournot–Nash equilibrium average price in any
sector as
(27) p¯(z)CN = b
Q(z)CN
n
+ wβ¯(z) = b
a− wβ¯(z)
2b+ γ(n− 1) + wβ¯(z) .
Thus I apply the definitions of price moments given in Eq. (9) to the equilibrium (sector-z)
average price in Eq. (27). The second uncentred moment of the distribution across sector of
the average price in each sector in term of the moments of the technology distribution is equal
to
(28) µp¯2 =
(ba)2 + 2ba(b+ γ(n− 1))wµβ¯1 + (b+ γ(n− 1))2w2µβ¯2
(2b+ γ(n− 1))2 .
For the first uncentred moment of the distribution across sectors of the price variance in each
39Note that if µ
σ2p
1 = 0 and γ tends to b, then the indirect utility function in Eq. (25) degenerates to that of Neary
(2003b;c)’s baseline model:
lim
γ→b
(
U
∣∣∣∣
µ
σ2p
1 =0
)
= lim
γ→b
U = 1
2b
(
a2 − λ2µp¯2
)
,
where µp¯2 is defined in Eq. (28) with γ tending to b.
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sector in term of the moments of the technology distribution, I use Eq. (15) together with the
definition of any firm’s Cournot–Nash profits. Firstly, I can write the Cournot–Nash equilib-
rium price variance in any sector as
(29) σ2p(z) =
∑n
i=1
[
p(i, z)CN
]2
n
− [p¯(z)CN]2 = ∑ni=1 [by(i, z)CN + c(i, z)]2
n
− [p¯(z)CN]2
=
b
n
n∑
i=1
pi(i, z)CN + w2σ2β(z) + w
2
[
β¯(z)
]2
+
2bw
n
n∑
i=1
y(i, z)CNβ(i, z)− [p¯(z)CN]2 ,
then, by integrating over all sectors both sides of Eq. (29) and using Eq. (16), I obtain
(30) µ
σ2p
1 =
b
n
ΠCN + w2µ
σ2β
1 + w
2µβ¯2 +
2bw
n
L− µp¯2 ,
where µp¯2 has been defined in Eq. (28).
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Having these preliminary results at hand, I can go on in analyzing social welfare. As for
aggregate profits, when the wage rate is exogenously treated, it is easy to show that a rise in
the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity negatively affects social welfare because µ
σ2β
1 is
positively related to only µ
σ2p
1 in Eq. (30) but not to µ
p¯
2 in Eq. (28). But µ
σ2p
1 has an negative
impact on the indirect utility function as I have already noted above in discussing Eqs. (25) and
(26). Hence, for any µ
σ2p
1 > 0 it holds that
(31)
∂
(
V∣∣
w exogenous
)
∂µ
σ2β
1
=
∂V
∂µ
σ2p
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
∂
(
µ
σ2p
1
∣∣
w exogenous
)
∂µ
σ2β
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
< 0 ,
with
(32)
∂
(
µ
σ2p
1
∣∣
w exogenous
)
∂µ
σ2β
1
=
b
n
∂
(
ΠCN
∣∣
w exogenous
)
∂µ
σ2β
1
+ w2 > 0 ,
40Note that, after some routine calculations, µ
σ2p
1 = 0 when goods are almost homogeneous (that is, γ tends to
b) and µ
σ2β
1 = 0 (i.e., no within-sector firm heterogeneity in any sector). The motive is clear: in any sector, without
both firm heterogeneity and good differentiation, firms will charge the same price.
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by considering Eqs. (21), (28), and (30).41
The negative effect of the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity on the indirect utility
function in Eq. (31), when the wage rate is treated as exogenous, is what one can observe from
the common perception on market power, which decreases competitiveness and therefore it
would distort allocation of resources deteriorating social welfare. This means that, for example,
if a rise in market concentration happens across all sectors of the economy (as measured by the
“average” within-sector firm heterogeneity), this has a negative effect on social welfare, without
considering general equilibrium feedback from the wage rate. Note that this result is in contrast
with partial equilibrium literature on the link between mean-preserving rise in cost dispersion
and welfare (e.g., Long and Soubeyran (1997; 2001) and Salant and Shaffer (1999)), in which
an increase in market concentration has a positive impact on welfare as it improves sectoral
total profits without affecting consumer surplus.
I turn now to calculate the impact of the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity on so-
cial welfare when the wage rate is treated as endogenous. This adds complexity to the analysis.
I proceed by steps as follows. By differentiating the indirect utility function in Eq. (26) with
respect to µ
σ2β
1 , I can write
(33)
∂
(
V
∣∣∣∣
w endogenous
)
∂µ
σ2β
1
=
∂V
∂µ
σ2p
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
∂
(
µ
σ2p
1
∣∣∣∣
w endogenous
)
∂µ
σ2β
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+/0/−)
+
∂V
∂µp¯2︸︷︷︸
(−)
∂
(
µp¯2
∣∣∣∣
w endogenous
)
∂µ
σ2β
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
,
with
(34)
∂
(
µp¯2
∣∣∣∣
w endogenous
)
∂µ
σ2β
1
=
∂w
∂µ
σ2β
1
(
2ba(b+ γ(n− 1))
(2b+ γ(n− 1))2 µ
β¯
1 +
2w(b+ γ(n− 1))2
(2b+ γ(n− 1))2 µ
β¯
2
)
,
by using Eq. (28). From Proposition 1 follows that the term outside parentheses at the right
hand side of Eq. (34) (i.e., the partial derivative) is negative whereas both terms within paren-
theses are positive. Hence, the partial derivative in Eq. (34) is negative. This means that the
41By using Eqs. (18) and (21), one can express Eq. (32) as
∂
(
µ
σ2p
1
∣∣
w exogenous
)
∂µ
σ2β
1
= w2
(
b2
(2b− γ)2 + 1
)
> 0 .
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second term on the right hand side of Eq. (33) is positive being the product of two negative
factors.
It remains to analyze the sign of the second factor in the first term at the right hand side of
Eq. (33). Differentiating Eq. (30) with respect to µ
σ2β
1 yields
∂
(
µ
σ2p
1
∣∣∣∣
w endogenous
)
∂µ
σ2β
1
=
b
n
∂
(
ΠCN
∣∣∣∣
w endogenous
)
∂µ
σ2β
1
+ w2 + 2w
(
µ
σ2β
1 + µ
β¯
2
) ∂w
∂µ
σ2β
1
+
2bL
n
∂w
∂µ
σ2β
1
−
∂
(
µp¯2
∣∣∣∣
w endogenous
)
∂µ
σ2β
1
.
(35)
It is sufficient to note that, like the right and side of Eq. (22), the first term at the right hand side
of Eq. (35) has an undetermined sign. Hence, the impact of the “average” within-sector firm
heterogeneity on social welfare, when the wage rate is treated as endogenous, may be either
positive, negative, or zero. This result is formally stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 5. In a GOLE framework with firm heterogeneities within sectors and wage rate
treated as endogenous, all other things being equal, a rise in the “average” within-sector firm
heterogeneity has not a clear-cut impact on social welfare, depending on the specific values of
the moments of the technology distribution as well as demand parameters.
The indeterminacy on the sign of the impact of a rise in the “average” within-sector firm
heterogeneity on the social welfare has potential implications for various strands of literature.
Firstly, I want to highlight how this result is not in any sense a suggestion against antitrust policy
in general, rather, it sheds more light on possible ambiguous outcomes of these policies, which
need to be sophisticated and implemented with caution, by taking into account possible negative
effects from a social point of view due to general equilibrium feedbacks from the endogenous
wage rate. Thus, my paper can provide, for its feature of linking market concentrations and
firm heterogeneities to social welfare, a first attempt to a GOLE extension of antitrust issues.42
Secondly, since the seminal work by Lahiri and Ono (1988), there has been a growing
research on the helping minor firms (see, e.g., Wang and Zhao (2007) for a welfare comparison
42For example, by moving from the considerations by Bork (1978) on the welfare-maximizing role of antitrust
policy, Brock and Obst (2009) develop a simple theoretical general equilibrium model in which market concen-
tration directly enters in the utility function of consumers. The authors show, via traditional trade-off conditions
on both marginal rate of transformations and substitutions, the Pareto optimal level of concentration towards the
antitrust authority should aim to maximize welfare.
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between Cournot and Bertrand competition with horizontal product differentiation). Lahiri
and Ono (1988), by adopting an asymmetric Cournot duopoly, have showed that to help a
minor firm by means of the reduction in its production cost, is harmful for social welfare,
when the cost difference between firms is sufficiently large. This result happens because the
help would decrease the efficient firm’s output whereas, via the standard effect of strategic
interaction, it would increase the minor firm’s output, making the total output less convenient.
Even though the help to the minor firm would decrease the market concentration and, thus,
increase the competition, it also has a contrasting impact on welfare, by increasing the average
cost of production in the sector. If the minor firm’s market share were sufficiently small, the
net impact would be welfare-enhancing. As my model shows, this result does not generalize to
a GOLE framework encompassing within-sector firm heterogeneities. My model qualifies this
theoretical literature, by putting in evidence that unclear outcomes may happen once general
equilibrium feedbacks can play a role via the endogenous wage rate.
Finally, the model presented here sheds also some light on literature on the link between
asymmetric-cost oligopoly and welfare (e.g., Long and Soubeyran (1997; 2001), and Salant
and Shaffer (1999)). This strand of literature has showed how a mean-preserving rise in the
cost dispersion can have welfare-enhancing effects as long as all firms continue to be active. In
my GOLE framework, this result does not immediately apply.
5 Concluding remarks and some possible extensions
The aim of this paper has been to give for the first time a fairly general, though simple, theoret-
ical contribution in which within-sector firm heterogeneities and oligopolistic competition are
considered together in general equilibrium. This is done without normalizing the wage rate,
which endogenously leads to the key findings via its general equilibrium feedbacks. Specifi-
cally, I have built a general oligopolistic equilibrium model augmented with within-sector firm
heterogeneities and product differentiation. The paper has analyzed the impact of a rise in a
measure of the average within-sector firm heterogeneity on wage rate, (country-wide) aggre-
gate profits, and social welfare. In the light of the empirical evidence on heterogeneous and
highly skewed firm productivities, the model presented here offers an important and interest-
ing theoretical tool to conduct exercises of comparative statics as well as to better understand
linkages between market concentrations and welfare effects. I have presented and solved the
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model for an arbitrary (small) number of heterogeneous firms producing horizontal differen-
tiated varieties of a good in each of “finely disaggregated” sectors. I have obtained unique
equilibrium outcomes, bringing in evidence some testable theoretical predictions that future
empirical studies should address.
Standard IO and antitrust literature, adopting partial equilibrium settings, has abstracted
from general equilibrium feedbacks. This paper has overcome this limiting feature by using
the GOLE approach. The theoretical contribution allows for obtaining new findings that can
be summarized as follows. I have derived a link between the first moment of the distribution
of firm heterogeneity (as measured by the within-sector variance of production costs) across
sectors and wage rate, aggregate profits, and social welfare. On the one hand, the “average”
within-sector firm heterogeneity unambiguously and negatively affects the wage rate. On the
other hand, the effect of the “average” on aggregate profits and social welfare has unexpectedly
been ambiguous because it crucially depends on the nature of the technology distribution and
demand parameters. Even though sharp policy prescriptions cannot be offered, implications of
these results are manifold. The possibility of a negative link between (economy-wide) market
concentrations and aggregate profits helps to explain unexpected findings in empirical research.
In addition, the research outcomes mean that antitrust policies aiming to affect competition and
market power within sectors, ought to be sophisticated, by considering not only the market
structure of single sectors, but also its effects on the economy as a whole, via the general
equilibrium feedbacks coming from labor market, and more in general from factor markets.
Finally, this paper has also offered a first step to better understand possible counterpro-
ductive policy outcomes, which can contrast with conventional wisdoms on welfare-enhancing
effects of antitrust and akin policies, as provided by standard partial equilibrium oligopoly
theory (e.g., the welfare-reducing effect due to the helping of minor firms).
A caveat is in order. The exercises of comparative statics throughout the paper and the
main findings are based on the assumption that the other moments of the technology distribu-
tion (of unit labor requirements) remain fixed while the variable of interest (i.e., the “average”
within-sector firm heterogeneity) is free to vary. This assumption may overlook possible links
among the moments of the technology distribution, which might be interconnected to each
other, depending on specific functional forms of technology distribution. The reader should
bear in mind this fact for the interpretation of findings of the impact of the “average” within-
sector firm heterogeneity. The full comparative statics analysis on the other moments of the
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technology distribution goes beyond this paper’s purpose.
I close this section by suggesting some possible extensions of the model that future research
agenda should consider in more detail. Firstly, in the interest of analytical tractability, the re-
sults admittedly rest on stylized model specifications of demand and cost functions. Although
I expect the findings would survive in more sophisticated models as long as inverse demand
functions are linear and production exhibits constant return to scale in order to guarantee de-
creasing best reply functions, further investigations are needed to fully establish conditions for
policy analysis. More general settings, however, are likely to not solve directly the ambiguous
effect of the “average” within-sector firm heterogeneity on aggregate profits and social welfare.
Nonetheless, I believe that my model has provided interesting insights to better understand the
role of firm heterogeneity and market concentration in general equilibrium, hoping that scholars
working on related topics would find them useful for their research.
Secondly, I have assumed a perfectly competitive labor market. This is a strong simplifying
assumption. Given the growing literature on GOLE studying labor market imperfections (e.g.,
unemployment and unions), it would be interesting to address those issues in a framework like
that presented here.
Thirdly, in order to obtain clear-cut results on aggregate profits and social welfare, one
might also put more structure to the model. Setting a parametrized distribution for firms’ pro-
ductivities, and therefore for firms’ production costs, is a natural extension. This would require
a specified technology, which may be parametrized by using a statistical distribution function,
such as the widely used Pareto or Fre´chet.
Finally, I have presented the model for a closed economy only. An open economy version
is worth being developed to further analyze the role played by firm heterogeneity and market
concentration, however, the key mechanisms of my model should be preserved. A question
should look at a generalization allowing for the case in which firms in a country compete
with those ones of the same sector localized in another country. This can be achieved with
a slightly heavier notation. Although industrial concentration within sectors is likely to de-
crease with more competing (active) firms with asymmetric costs becoming more close to each
other, the effect of trade liberalization is not straightforward. As long as one allows for the firm
entry-and-exit process, trade liberalization effects also depend on the level of within-sector firm
heterogeneities in the trade partners and, more generally, on the knowledge of both economic
structures, which might also widen the productivity dispersions in internationalized sectors.
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A further open economy extension might allow for cross-country-industry differences in tech-
nology distributions, by analyzing the implications for wage rates, and therefore for gains for
trade and trade patterns. Cross-country differences in economy-wide wage rates can play an
important role in affecting international competitiveness of firms, and via general equilibrium,
shape international competitiveness of countries. The model can be also applied to analyze
strategic trade policies with firm heterogeneity, an issue that has been addressed only by using
either partial equilibrium framework or a normalized wage rate. As I have argued, carrying
out open economy extensions would increase in many ways our understanding on the conse-
quences of globalization on welfare changes. The model presented here might also be used as
a complementary setting in analyzing other issues, which have been considered by means of
the monopolistic competition approach.
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